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superior forecastability as long as the degree of uncertainty about sunspot fluctuations is 
relatively small. 
 
JEL codes: C53; C62; E17 
 
                                                 
* Ippei Fujiwara, Crawford School of Economics and Government, Lennox Crossing, Building #132, The 
Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. Ippei.fujiwara@anu.edu.au.  Yasao Hirose, 
Faculty of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan. 
yhirose@econ.keio.ac.jp. We have benefited from discussions with Rochelle Edge and Rhys Mendes. The 
views in this paper are those of the authors  and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Japan, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System. 1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that the forecasting performance of macro-
econometric models has deteriorated during the Great Moderation. Over the period
from the mid-1980s, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) ￿nd that a random walk forecast
outperforms the forecasts in the Greenbook and by the backward-looking Phillips
curve. Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002) and Orphanides and van Norden (2005) con￿rm
this result of poor forecasting performance of Phillips curve models over simple uni-
variate models. D￿ Agostino, Giannone, and Surico (2006) show that a wider range
of time-series forecasting models such as factor-augmented AR models and pooled
bivariate models cannot improve on simple univariate models. Faust and Wright
(2009) document that forecasting performances improve when the sample before the
Great Moderation is included. On the statistical sources of the lack of forecastability
during the Great Moderation, Stock and Watson (2007) note that in￿ ation dynamics
have become in most part driven by transitory and thus unforecastable component.1
Similar conclusions are reported by Tulip (2009) for the Greenbook forecasts and by
Trehan (2009) for the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Why does the transitory component become more dominant than the permanent
one during the Great Moderation? Edge and Gurkaynak (2010) argue that this stems
from active monetary policy since the mid-1980s. As explicitly shown in Goodfriend
and King (2009), when a central bank actively adjusts the nominal interest rate in
response to in￿ ation, in￿ ation dynamics become less persistent. In the extreme case
where the central bank aims at completely stabilizing in￿ ation, in￿ ation dynamics
are solely governed by transitory cost-push shocks. Consequently, under extremely
aggressive monetary policy, we lose the forecastability of in￿ ation and so as of other
macroeconomic variables. In fact, Estrella (2005) claims that the failure of the term
structure to incorporate predictive component of in￿ ation is due to the changes in
the U.S. monetary policy.
1Roberts (2004) ￿nds that the Phillips curve becomes ￿ atter in the mid-1980s and coe¢ cients
on the lagged in￿ ation rates changed. Fuhrer, Olivei, and Tootell (2009) also point out the changes
in parameters associated with in￿ ation dynamics during the Great Moderation.
2These ￿ndings about the di¢ culties in macroeconomic forecasts during the Great
Moderation conversely imply that forecastability is higher in the preceding era. This
argument is, however, somewhat counterintuitive. It has been documented that
the U.S. monetary policy before the 1980s was passive against in￿ ation so that the
equilibrium was indeterminate. Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) argue that the
U.S. monetary policy during the pre-Volcker era is consistent with indeterminacy
based on the GMM estimates of monetary policy rules. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
reach the same conclusion by estimating a New Keynesian model that allows for
both determinacy and indeterminacy.2 Under indeterminacy, the economy can be
unexpectedly volatile because sunspot shocks, which are non-fundamental beliefs of
agents, additionally a⁄ect the equilibrium dynamics. Thus, it is not easy to imagine
a situation where one can forecast better under indeterminacy.
In contrast to this casual view against the forecastability under indeterminacy,
this paper explore the possibility of better forecastability under indeterminacy us-
ing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. First, we analytically
show the case where the equilibrium dynamics of a macroeconomic variable are
characterized by an i.i.d. process under determinacy but are characterized by an
ARMA process under indeterminacy. The endogenous persistence implied by the
ARMA representation can improve forecastability under indeterminacy. Then, using
a prototypical New Keynesian model estimated in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we
demonstrate that the model with passive monetary policy, which leads to indeter-
minacy, can yield superior forecastability compared to the one with active monetary
policy. In addition, we present the possibility that the forecast performance under
indeterminacy can be worse when the degree of uncertainty about sunspot shocks is
large.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple ex-
ample where indeterminacy can result in better forecastability. Section 3 numerically
illustrates our argument using a New Keynesian model. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2The applications of the methodology proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) are found in
Benati and Surico (2009) and Hirose (2007, 2008, 2010).
32 Forecastability under Indeterminacy
To illustrate the forecastability of a DSGE model under indeterminacy, a simple
example is presented. Consider the following univariate linear rational expectations





where E denotes the mathematical expectation operator, "t ￿i.i.d.(0;￿2
") is a fun-
damental shock, and ￿ is a parameter. Following Sims (2002), we de￿ne a rational
expectations forecast error ￿t such that
yt = Et￿1yt + ￿t:
Then, the system is expressed as
Etyt+1 = ￿Et￿1yt ￿ ￿"t + ￿￿t:
If ￿ > 1, a unique non-explosive solution exists when E0y1 = 0 and "t + ￿t = 0.
Then, the solution under determinacy is of the form:
yt = "t; (1)
which implies that yt follows the i.i.d. process.
If ￿ ￿ 1, on the other hand, the stability requirement imposes no restriction on the
rational expectations forecast error ￿t. In this case, following Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003, 2004), ￿t can be expressed as a linear combination of the fundamental shock
"t and a vector of sunspot shocks ￿t:
￿t = ~ M"t + M￿￿t;
where both ~ M and M￿ are arbitrary parameters, unrelated to ￿. The vector of
sunspot shocks ￿t consists of non-fundamental disturbances that include self-ful￿lling
beliefs of agents. For simplicity, we de￿ne a reduced form sunspot shock ￿
￿
t = M￿￿t
with the dimension of the sunspot shocks being unity. Then, the solution under
indeterminacy is given by the following ARMA (1, 1) representation:
yt = ￿yt￿1 + ~ M"t ￿ ￿
￿
t ￿ ￿"t￿1: (2)
4Therefore, yt in equation (2) exhibits richer dynamics than that in equation (1). In
particular, endogenous persistence implied by equation (2) can help replicate the
sample properties of data in the period before the Great Moderation, and hence the
forecast performance based on this solution can be improved.
￿ is a key parameter to contribute to higher forecastability since it characterizes
the persistence of the dynamic behavior of yt. On the other hand, uncertainty about
the sunspot shock ￿
￿
t potentially disturb forecasting under indeterminacy. If the
variance of ￿
￿
t is relatively small compared to ￿, forecastability becomes higher under
indeterminacy even though the additional non-fundamental disturbance comes into
e⁄ect in the equilibrium dynamics. In what follows, we examine how results can




We consider a prototypical New Keynesian monetary DSGE model estimated in
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004):3
~ yt = Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1 (~ r
n
t ￿ Et~ ￿t+1) + gt; (3)
~ ￿t = ￿Et~ ￿t+1 + ￿(~ yt ￿ zt); (4)
~ r
n
t = ￿r~ r
n
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)
￿
 ￿~ ￿t +  y (~ yt ￿ zt)
￿
+ "r;t; "r;t ￿ i.i.d. N(0;￿
2
r); (5)
where ~ yt denotes the percentage deviation of output from a trend path, and ~ ￿t and
~ rn
t are the percentage deviations of in￿ ation and the short-term nominal interest rate
from their steady-state values.
Equation (3) is a dynamic IS equation obtained from the optimality conditions
for households￿utility maximization. gt captures the net e⁄ects of exogenous shifts
on their preferences, which we call a demand shock. ￿ is the inverse of intertemporal
3The detailed description of the model is found in such standard textbooks as Woodford (2003),
Gal￿ (2008) and Walsh (2010).
5substitution elasticity. Equation (4) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve derived from
pro￿t maximization of monopolistically competitive ￿rms that face a Calvo (1983)-
style nominal rigidity. zt represents exogenous changes in the marginal costs of
production. ￿ is the subjective discount factor, and ￿ is a function of the probability
that ￿rms can re-optimize their prices and the households￿preference parameters.
Equation (5) is a Taylor (1993) style monetary policy rule. "r;t is interpreted as an
unsystematic component of monetary policy. ￿r is the policy smoothing parameter,
whereas  ￿ and  y are the degrees of policy responses to in￿ ation and the output
gap.
Both gt and zt evolve according to the following AR(1) processes:
gt = ￿ggt￿1 + "g;t; "g;t ￿ i.i.d. N(0;￿
2
g);
zt = ￿zzt￿1 + "z;t; "z;t ￿ i.i.d. N(0;￿
2
z);
where we assume that the innovations, "r;t, "g;t and "g;t, are uncorrelated with each
other.
3.2 Solution under Indeterminacy
The preceding equations can be written as the following linear rational expectations
system:
￿0 (￿)st = ￿1 (￿)st￿1 + ￿(￿)"t + ￿(￿)￿t;
where st = [~ yt; ~ ￿t; ~ rn
t ;gt;zt;Et~ yt+1;Et~ ￿t+1]
0, "t = ["g;t;"z;t;"r;t]





[~ yt ￿ Et￿1~ yt; ~ ￿t ￿ Et￿1~ ￿t]
0. ￿0, ￿1, ￿ and ￿ are the conformable matrices that depend
on the vector of structural parameters ￿.
According to Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), a full set of solutions is of the form:
st = ￿
￿ (￿)st￿1 + ￿
￿(￿; ~ M)"t + ￿
￿ (￿;M￿)￿t;
where ￿t is a vector of sunspot shocks. Whereas the coe¢ cient matrix ￿￿ depends ex-
clusively on ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿ depend on the arbitrary matrices, ~ M and M￿, respectively,
as well as ￿.
6We specify a particular solution as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). First, we
choose ~ M such that the contemporaneous impact of the fundamental shocks is contin-
uous on the boundary of determinacy and indeterminacy regions. Second we impose
the normalization M￿ = 1 with the dimension of the sunspot shocks being unity. For
notational simplicity, we rewrite the particular solution as
st = ￿1st￿1 + ￿""t + ￿￿￿t; (6)
where ￿t ￿i.i.d. N(0;￿2
￿).
3.3 Data and Forecasting Procedure
The data used for our analysis are the same as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Ob-
served output deviations from trend, in￿ ation, and interest rates are stacked in the
vector Yt. The measurement equations that relate Yt to the vector of model variables
st are given by
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and ￿￿ and r￿ are the steady-state in￿ ation rate and real interest rate respectively.
The measurement equations (7) together with the law of motion (6) for st consti-
tute a state-space model for the observables Yt. The Kalman ￿lter is used to compute
the ￿ltered latent series st.
Let H denote a forecast horizon. For each t, forecasting starts from the ￿ltered









the distributions speci￿ed above. We then iterate the equations (6) and (7) forward
7Table 1: Parameter setting
￿ ￿  ￿  y ￿r ￿g ￿z r￿ ￿￿ ￿r ￿g ￿z ￿￿














t+hjt = A0 + A1s
(i)
t+hjt;
for h = 1;:::;H. This process is repeated for i = 1;:::;I, and the mean forecast ^ Yt+hjt




Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameters. The inverse of intertemporal substi-
tution elasticity (￿ = 1) and the slope of the Phillips curve (￿ = 0:33) are in line
with the parameter values used in standard textbooks such as Gal￿ (2008) and Walsh
(2010). Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), we parameterize the in￿ ation co-
e¢ cient ( ￿ = 0:95) in the monetary policy rule so that equilibrium indeterminacy
arises due to passive monetary policy. The output gap coe¢ cient in the policy rule
( y = 0:125) follows from the original Taylor (1993) rule. The policy smoothing pa-
rameter, ￿r, and the autoregressive coe¢ cients for demand and cost shocks, ￿g and
￿z, are all ￿xed at 0.5. The standard deviation of the shocks (￿r = 0:23, ￿g = 0:27,
￿z = 1:13, and ￿￿ = 0:20) are set according to the posterior mean estimates in Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004).
3.5 Results
We evaluate the forecastability of the New Keynesian model under indeterminacy
in terms of four-period-ahead forecasts for the percentage deviations of output from
8Table 2: RMSE comparison
Baseline  ￿ = 1:05 ￿￿ = 0:5 ￿￿ = 0:7
RMSE for output (%) 1.91 1.88 1.92 1.92
RMSE for in￿ ation (%) 2.81 3.45 3.15 4.07
Note: RMSEs for four-period-ahead forecasts of output and in￿ ation are computed recursively with
data from 1960:1 to 1979:2.
the trend and of in￿ ation from the steady-state. Table 2 shows the root mean
square errors (RMSEs) in the pre-Volcker sample (1960:1 to 1979:2) in four parameter
settings: baseline (the parameters presented above), the case of determinacy ( ￿ =
1:05), the cases of more uncertainty due to sunspots (￿￿ = 0:5 and ￿￿ = 0:7). We
focus on the RMSEs for in￿ ation because the RMSEs for output are almost the same
across the parameter settings.
A remarkable ￿nding here is that the model under indeterminacy exhibits a better
forecast performance than the model under determinacy. Yet, at the same time, the
economy under indeterminacy can be unexpectedly volatile due to sunspot shocks.
Such an uncertainty potentially makes the forecast more di¢ cult. The last two
columns in Table 2 demonstrate this point; i.e., the increased volatilities in the
sunspot shock lead to the larger RMSEs. In particular, when the standard deviation
of the sunspot shock increased to 0.7, the forecast performance becomes worse than
that under determinacy.
4 Conclusion
Indeterminacy implies that economy can ￿ uctuate with non-fundamental sunspot
shocks. This, however, does not necessarily worsen the forecastability. Thanks to the
endogenous persistence stemming from indeterminacy, the forecasting performance of
DSGE models can improve under indeterminacy, as long as the degree of uncertainty
about sunspot shocks is relatively small.
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